New Pennsylvania DUI refusal suspension case
In a new Pennsylvania DUI case, decided on January 7, 2009, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania upheld the 18 month suspension of a driver accused of DUI.
The case is William SCHLAG v PennDOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, and it goes through an analysis of what the DOT must show in a DUI refusal hearing.
Quotes from the opinion:
As to the merits, we note, to sustain a suspension of operating privileges under Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, PennDOT must establish a licensee: (1) was arrested for DUI by a police officer who had reasonable grounds to believe the licensee was operating or was in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was warned refusal might result in a license suspension. Banner v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 558 Pa. 439, 737 A.2d 1203 (1999).
As to the merits, we note, to sustain a suspension of operating privileges under Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, PennDOT must establish a licensee: (1) was arrested for DUI by a police officer who had reasonable grounds to believe the licensee was operating or was in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was warned refusal might result in a license suspension. Banner v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 558 Pa. 439, 737 A.2d 1203 (1999).
Comments:
Nothing noteworthy about this opinion except it gives a good outline of what Pennsylvania courts will consider in regards to refusal hearings. It shows how much power and discretion the average Pennsylvania police officer has over a citizen accused of DUI, and how difficult it is to save a drivers license from PennDOT even if you were not the driver of the vehicle, when an officer alleges you refused the DUI chemical test.
Complex DUI license issues
One of the most frustrating parts of dealing with DUI and vehicular cases is the cross-over collateral issues with the Motor Vehicles Department. This new case out of Pennsylvania illustrates the complex interplay of criminal and civil licensing issues.
Excerpts (I highly suggest that you read the whole opinion in this case to get the full import of the complexity of the interplay):
Finally, Licensee's argument that he was not sentenced under the proper section of the Vehicle Code, must be heard on an appeal from his underlying criminal conviction, not before this Court. Licensees may not collaterally attack an underlying criminal conviction during a civil license suspension proceeding. Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436, 639 A.2d 1174 (1994). Thus, PennDOT properly imposed a one-year suspension of Licensee's operating privileges because competent, unrebutted evidence established Licensee was not sentenced under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(a)(1) and therefore was not entitled to the "no-suspension exception."
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision sustaining the one-year suspension of Licensee's operating privileges.
Analysis: DUI cases are extremely complex. The interplay of civil licensing issues and criminal penalties means that the practitioner must constantly keep on top of new developments in DUI law.
Drug DUI Case: Urine quantification not necessary
In Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth need not show a quantity of illegal drugs in a person’s blood to admit a urine sample against them in a prosecution for drug related DUI.
The Cite: Commonwealth v. Williamson, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Filed December 2, 2008.
Quotes from the opinion:
Prior to trial the lower court suppressed the results of Williamson's post-arrest urine test because the toxicologist's report did not state the amount of the drug found in her blood. The trial court found that 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547, a statute that discusses the admissibility of chemical tests in section 3802 prosecutions, created a mandatory requirement that chemical test reports express an "amount" of "alcohol or controlled substance" appearing in the defendant's blood in order for such results to be admissible in this section 3802 case. Specifically, the trial judge held that since the introductory paragraph of subsection 1547(c) [FN5] includes the language, "the amount of alcohol or controlled substance in the defendant's blood," then if the amount of the controlled substance is not contained in a report, that report is inadmissible.
First, the purpose of subsection 1547(c) is to outline the approved procedures and equipment (including qualified personnel, licensed laboratories and facilities) used for chemical testing of a person's breath, blood, or urine for relevant summary and criminal proceedings. Here, Williamson did not challenge the admission of the toxicologist's report on any of these bases. Second, in order to convict a defendant for the offense for which Williamson was charged, the Commonwealth does not need to prove or show the amount of the controlled substance involved in the prosecution. Rather, the offense only requires proof that the defendant was under the influence to a degree that causes impairment. Therefore, because the specific quantity or amount of the drug in the defendant's system is not an element of the offense, section 1547 is not even applicable to the instant case. Thus, we reverse and remand.
My Analysis: Some states don’t even require that the prosecutor even prove that the person was under the influence of an illegal drug. Some states drug related DUI law requires only that the state show the mere presence of the illegal drug, or even its metabolite. They don’t even need to show that the drug was active at the time of driving to get a conviction.
That is because it is extremely hard to quantify drug-related impairment in DUI cases.
The logic of this ruling based on the Pennsylvania DUI statute makes sense. The state would simply need to prove impairment through another means (such as a drug recognition evaluation) after the urine sample shows the presence of the illegal drug.
