New Georgia DUI implied consent opinion
On April 23, 2009, the Court of Appeals of Georgia issued a new DUI opinion regarding the interpretation and application of Georgia's new implied consent law.
The case is Williams v. State of Georgia, and no official citation is available at this time. The case hinges on Georgia's implied consent law.
ISSUE:
Shawn Williams was charged with vehicular homicide, reckless driving, driving while under the influence of a drug, following too closely, and serious injury by vehicle. He moved to suppress results of a blood test that police obtained from him without first informing him of his implied consent rights. [FN1] The trial court denied his motion, but certified the order for immediate review. We granted Williams' application for interlocutory review. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
RULING:
The amendment at issue here, however, is different. It states that nothing in the implied consent law precludes the state from acquiring a defendant's voluntary consent to chemical testing, or admitting into evidence the results of that testing. The implied consent statute grants drivers the right to refuse to take a state-administered test, with one of the consequences of exercising that right being that evidence of such refusal is admissible at trial. Unlike the amendment at issue in the cases relied upon by the state, the amendment here eliminates the need to give the notice where an individual "voluntarily" agrees to testing. This amendment not only changes the substance of the implied consent warning, it does away with the requirement that the warning be given at all where an officer manages to otherwise lawfully obtain consent to testing. This is not merely a procedural or evidentiary change, but one eliminating a defendant's substantive right to refuse to submit to testing. Therefore, the trial court erred in applying the amendment retroactively and in denying Williams' motion to suppress.
For more about Georgia DUI Law, see also, Georgia DUI Penalties and Georgia DUI Process.
Georgia DUI News: House struck by high BAC driver in Rome
There are people who are barely able to stand and function at the legal limit of 0.080. Then there are people who are highly functional at twice that. Here is some news from a Georgia DUI case about a man who was four times the legal limit at the time he hit a car and a house.
Rome News - Tribune: "A Rome man is in jail today, charged with ramming into a parked car and a house on his way home Sunday night.
According to Floyd County Jail records:
Pedro Coj Ruiz, 37, of 812 Darlington Way, was arrested late Sunday and charged with DUI, driving without a license and striking an unattended vehicle.
Police said Ruiz was driving a 2009 red Ford Aerostar on East Ninth Street about 8 p.m. when he sideswiped a 1993 Jeep Cherokee and continued onto Maple Avenue.
A witness provided a license number and officers contacted 911 for the address.
Upon arriving at Ruiz’s Darlington Way home, police found him leaning up against his van, talking to a neighbor whose house he had just hit as he pulled into the drive.
Ruiz reportedly smelled of alcohol and was ‘unstable,’ so an officer helped him sit in his van while he was questioned. A field sobriety test was not conducted because he was unable to stand on his own.
A breath alcohol test given to him at the station registered results of .342 and .324. The legal limit is .08 for drivers in Georgia."
Most jurisdictions now punish very high BAC drivers more severely than they do low level drivers. I question whether this is right or not. Since you or I may be just as impaired at a .120 as Mr. Ruiz from the article was a .324, would you or I be any less of a danger to ourselves and others? I think not.
Now, if I'm at the same level of impairment at a .120 as Mr. Ruiz is at a .324, who do you think needs help more? I vote for Mr. Ruiz because you have to have a serious alcohol tolerance and probably a serious alcohol problem to be able to get that high. Should we punish him more because of his problem. I argue that we shouldn't, as long as he agrees to get help. Getting Mr. Ruiz help is the only thing that will ultimately make society and Mr. Ruiz safe.
Georgia DUI opinion re: demurrer
In a new Georgia DUI Opinion, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a DUI dismissal based on defective charging documents.
The case is Georgia v. King, and the opinion was issued on March 2, 2009.
For an indepth discussion of the case, see DUI Attorney News, and learn the Georgia DUI Law basics.
Georgia DUI breath test case addresses police pressure
On January 13, 2009 the Georgia Court of Appeals reinstated a breath test that had been suppressed based on the Georgia DUI defendant's testimony that she was, essentially, pressured into taking a chemical test after refusing it.
The trial court found the defendant's testimony credible, and believed that her assertion that she felt that she would be held in jail if she didn't cooperate and take the test.
The case is State v. Quezada.
The facts and Issue:
Prior to trial, Quezada moved to suppress the results of her breath tests, arguing that she did not voluntarily consent to the same. At the motion to suppress hearing, Quezada testified that she changed her mind and agreed to the breathalyzer test after Knight repeatedly asked her to do so, explaining "I just felt that I ... wasn't going to get out of there [the jail] unless I did it." On rebuttal, Knight testified that he did not repeatedly ask Quezada to take the test but instead merely told her that, if she changed her mind, she could take the breath test. Knight further stated that he did not threaten Quezada to get her to take the test nor did he offer her a benefit or other inducement to submit a breath sample.
The trial court credited Knight's testimony, finding that nothing in the evidence indicated that Quezada was coerced or threatened into submitting to the chemical tests. The trial court nevertheless granted Quezada's motion to suppress, based on Quezada's refusal, at the time of her arrest, to submit to chemical testing. The State now appeals from the trial court's order.
The question in this case is whether Quezada rescinded her initial refusal to submit to a breath test. In granting the motion to suppress, the trial court relied on Howell v. State, 266 Ga.App. 480 (597 S.E.2d 546) (2004), interpreting that decision as holding that once a suspect has refused to submit to chemical testing, the State may not thereafter ask the suspect a second time if she will submit to such testing. Howell, however, does not stand for such a proposition.
Holding:
Quezada, by her own admission, then "changed her mind" and agreed to take the test, (footnote omitted) in the absence or any threats or inducements by Knight. In light of Stapleton, therefore, we conclude that Knight did not act unreasonably and that the trial court erred in granting Quezada's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order. (all emphasis added)
My Comments:
In some states this is not even an issue. In Arizona DUI law, for example, when a person refuses the officers can apply for a search warrant and forcibly take a blood test. When you compare even the (supposed) misinterpretation that the the trial judge in this case made to the law in states such as Arizona (which from my informal survey is probably the most extreme DUI jurisdiction in the nation), it shows how very differently DUIs are treated in the judicial system from state to state.
Right now we are working on putting together a comprehensive comparative guide to DUI law in all 50 states, which should be ready within the next month or so.
Georgia DUI roadblocks: A map to GA DWI law
On January 8, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued an opinion in a Georgia DUI roadblock case that does a good job of describing how GA law treats roadblocks. The case is Holowiak v. State.
There were two major issues in this appeal. The first was the Intoxilyzer 5000 source code. The court found that the defendant didn't jump through the right hoops for them to seriously consider compelling the testimony of the manufacturer of the Intoxilyzer line of breath test machines.
I am posting this case because of the last paragraph of the opinion, which is quoted below:
Here, the State established that all drivers were stopped at a specific location for a minimal amount of time; the roadblock was well identified as a police checkpoint; and the screening officer was sufficiently qualified. Further, the supervisory officer who initiated the roadblock testified that its primary purpose was traffic enforcement, "to enhance safe travel for citizens through the county to identify any drivers who were violating state laws and specifically looking for unlicensed or licensed violations and impaired drivers and remove those drivers from the roadway." The supervisor's memorandum regarding the roadblock confirms that the primary purpose during the New Year's Eve holiday was to "identify and charge accordingly those drivers who are operating motor vehicles in violation of State Laws" and especially to "identify those who are driving impaired or unlicensed and remove them from the roadways." "[A] roadblock that serves as a highway safety checkpoint is valid in its primary purpose, even if the safety violations for which the officers are looking are several." Kellogg v. State, 288 Ga.App. 265, 268(1)(a) (653 S.E.2d 841) (2007). The trial court did not err in denying Holowiak's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the roadblock.
My thoughts of GA DUI roadblocks: A highway safety roadblock is a valid purpose in Georgia. I get that. What I want to know is what other reasons they might choose to do a roadblock?
Bent of mind okay in Georgia DUI cases
Georgia Court of Appeals has ruled that an odd “bent of mind” rule that allows for the use of evidence of prior acts in DUI cases to show a propensity to drive drunk is constitutional, although unique to Georgia.
The Cite: Wade v. State, Court of Appeals of Georgia, Issued December 2, 2008 (link will be posted when available)
Excerpts from the opinion:
The State provided notice of its intent to introduce at trial a prior DUI conviction to show Wade's bent of mind and course of conduct, and the trial court held a hearing during which Wade stipulated to the admission of such evidence at trial only to prevent the State's witnesses from having to appear, but reserved, with the court's permission, the issue of the constitutionality of the admission of such evidence for appellate review. We therefore treat Wade's arguments as preserved for appeal.
Wade argues that the admission of similar transaction evidence in a case such as this, a generic DUI charge arising from a roadside traffic stop, violates due process. As Wade notes, the law in Georgia has evolved to the point of allowing the inclusion of similar transaction evidence in the trial of an unrelated offense to prove, among other things, the defendant's bent of mind, as was done here.
Compounding this danger of improper prejudice, the probative value is low in cases such as this, where a generic DUI offense is at issue, because the State does not need evidence of a prior act to show motive, intent, identity, plan, scheme, or other generally accepted rationale for admitting such evidence. As we have already recognized, in exercising discretion as to whether to admit the inflammatory evidence of prior acts,
the court should consider whether the State's need for the similar transaction evidence outweighs the prejudice inherent to the defendant. This consideration consists of at least two questions. First, is the issue for which the State is introducing the evidence a genuinely disputed issue? For example, if identity is the State's announced purpose but is not an issue contested by defendant, then the probative value of the similar transaction evidence is acutely if not fatally diminished.
As Wade's identity was not at issue, and as DUI is not a crime of specific intent, Wade contends that there was no need for the State to introduce the evidence.
Wade points out that Georgia is the only state to recognize the bent of mind exception, and we have found no authority to the contrary. Professor Paul S. Milich has studied the topic and observed that " '[b]ent of mind' is neither a traditional nor widely accepted category for the admission of independent crimes or acts. Indeed, no other American jurisdiction uses it." It is this unique feature of Georgia's law that Wade now challenges.
Nevertheless, we are not authorized to depart from the precedent of the Supreme Court of Georgia authorizing the bent of mind rationale for admitting similar transaction evidence here.
Accordingly, we are constrained to affirm the trial court's judgment, notwithstanding appellant's due process arguments.
My Analysis: Wow. My legal analysis is that this law is stupid and outrageous. The Defense in this case had one of the best and most accomplished DUI defense lawyers in the country, and still got stuck with this terrible ruling. Hopefully the Supreme Court of Georgia will fix this mess.
In the meantime, if you get a DUI in Georgia, the prosecutor can try to prove that you are a drunk in general to show that you were impaired on the date in question.
Really stupid and dangerous. From the opinion it sounds like the Court of Appeals here even thinks that the rule is insane, but doesn't want to overstep its authority and is therefore deferring to the Supreme Court.
Georgia DUI Case Law - New probable cause to arrest case
In an opinion published on October 24, 2008, the Georgia Court Of Appeals reversed a conviction because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest for DUI.
The case is Handley v. The State. At present, only the Westlaw site is available 2008 WL 4694283.
The main holdings are quoted below.
"Evidence which shows only that a defendant had alcohol in her body while driving provides insufficient probable cause to arrest for driving under the influence. Impaired driving ability depends solely upon an individual's response to alcohol. Because individual responses to alcohol vary, the presence of alcohol in a defendant's body, by itself, does not support an inference that the defendant was an impaired driver.
Here, the State offered no evidence showing that Handley's driving ability was impaired due to alcohol consumption. The deputy testified that he noticed nothing remarkable about Handley's driving. The State presented no evidence showing that Handley's speech was slurred, her gait was unsteady, or her eyes were bloodshot, watery, or glassy, and the deputy conducted no field sobriety tests. The only evidence offered was that the officer smelled alcohol on Handley's breath, the alco-sensor test revealed the presence of alcohol, and Handley admitted that she had been drinking "earlier in the day." This evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to constitute probable cause to arrest Handley for driving under the influence."
