California DUI and vehicular mansluaghter case 2.20.09
The California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division Three for Los Angeles County filed an opinion on February 20, 2009 in the case of The People v. Martinez. This California DUI and vehicular manslaughter opinion discusses the issues of:
- Causation; and
- Lesser included offenses.
The lesser included offense issue apparently came down to who was named as a victim in what charge.
Interesting read. For more in-depth analysis, see also DUI news.
DUI manslaughter not "crime of violence"
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, has held that a California conviction for DUI/manslaughter, in the absence of gross negligence, didn’t qualify as a “crime of violence” for the purpose of enhancing a sentence for previous post-conviction deportation for a felony.
The Cite: United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Javier GOMEZ-LEON, Defendant-Appellant. No. 05-50138. Argued and Submitted March 4, 2008. Filed Sept. 24, 2008.
Relevant quotes from the case:
Gomez was not convicted of ordinary involuntary or vehicular manslaughter, as California defines it; he was convicted of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, a particular type of manslaughter. Some states have created special statutes to punish drunk driving homicides as “a number of states have enacted statutes creating the new crime of homicide by automobile.” See 2 LaFave, supra, § 15.4(e) (stating that such a statute is “related to the crime of manslaughter but is not manslaughter proper”). Typically, such statutes require proof of intoxication while driving a vehicle and are punished less severely than manslaughter. 2 LaFave, supra, § 15.4(e). Commensurate with lesser punishment is a lesser mens rea requirement, where the state often permits conviction under the statute when the defendant has a mens rea that is less than recklessness…
Since Gomez's conviction under California Penal Code section 192(c)(3) (1998) for “vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated without gross negligence” is an offense that requires only proof of ordinary negligence, it cannot fall within the contemporary meaning of manslaughter as enumerated in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. 1(B)(iii). Therefore, the district court erred in finding that it was a “crime of violence” for the purposes of applying a sixteen-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
Neither Gomez's conviction for a “drug trafficking offense” nor his conviction under California Penal Code section 192(c)(3) justifies the application of a sixteen-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b). Consequently, Gomez's sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the district court for re-sentencing in a manner consistent with our opinion.
Analysis and significance: This case is sure to touch a nerve among those debating the illegal immigration issue. On the one side is the argument that this guy is a felon. He was here illegally. He was deported. He came back. He then killed somebody, albeit by negligence.
On the other hand is the argument that a DUI manslaughter is not an intentional killing in the conventional sense, and a person, legally in the country or not, should not be punished disproportionally by virtue of who he or she is, and that we should all be punished based only on what we have done.
