Georgia DUI breath test case addresses police pressure
On January 13, 2009 the Georgia Court of Appeals reinstated a breath test that had been suppressed based on the Georgia DUI defendant's testimony that she was, essentially, pressured into taking a chemical test after refusing it.
The trial court found the defendant's testimony credible, and believed that her assertion that she felt that she would be held in jail if she didn't cooperate and take the test.
The case is State v. Quezada.
The facts and Issue:
Prior to trial, Quezada moved to suppress the results of her breath tests, arguing that she did not voluntarily consent to the same. At the motion to suppress hearing, Quezada testified that she changed her mind and agreed to the breathalyzer test after Knight repeatedly asked her to do so, explaining "I just felt that I ... wasn't going to get out of there [the jail] unless I did it." On rebuttal, Knight testified that he did not repeatedly ask Quezada to take the test but instead merely told her that, if she changed her mind, she could take the breath test. Knight further stated that he did not threaten Quezada to get her to take the test nor did he offer her a benefit or other inducement to submit a breath sample.
The trial court credited Knight's testimony, finding that nothing in the evidence indicated that Quezada was coerced or threatened into submitting to the chemical tests. The trial court nevertheless granted Quezada's motion to suppress, based on Quezada's refusal, at the time of her arrest, to submit to chemical testing. The State now appeals from the trial court's order.
The question in this case is whether Quezada rescinded her initial refusal to submit to a breath test. In granting the motion to suppress, the trial court relied on Howell v. State, 266 Ga.App. 480 (597 S.E.2d 546) (2004), interpreting that decision as holding that once a suspect has refused to submit to chemical testing, the State may not thereafter ask the suspect a second time if she will submit to such testing. Howell, however, does not stand for such a proposition.
Holding:
Quezada, by her own admission, then "changed her mind" and agreed to take the test, (footnote omitted) in the absence or any threats or inducements by Knight. In light of Stapleton, therefore, we conclude that Knight did not act unreasonably and that the trial court erred in granting Quezada's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order. (all emphasis added)
My Comments:
In some states this is not even an issue. In Arizona DUI law, for example, when a person refuses the officers can apply for a search warrant and forcibly take a blood test. When you compare even the (supposed) misinterpretation that the the trial judge in this case made to the law in states such as Arizona (which from my informal survey is probably the most extreme DUI jurisdiction in the nation), it shows how very differently DUIs are treated in the judicial system from state to state.
Right now we are working on putting together a comprehensive comparative guide to DUI law in all 50 states, which should be ready within the next month or so.
