California's highest court says juries can consider accuracy of breath tests in DUI cases - Los Angeles Times: “SAN FRANCISCO (AP) — The California Supreme Court has joined a handful of other courts in the country that have said Breathalyzer results mean different things for different people and ruled that suspected drunken drivers can attack the test results in court.

Defense attorneys lauded Thursday's unanimous ruling for deferring to science, which has shown for years that the test results are highly variable. Prosecutors, however, predicted the move will undermine California drunken driving cases.

At issue is how authorities use booze breath to determine how much alcohol is in the bloodstream.

When consumed, alcohol is absorbed in the blood and carried through the brain to the liver and heart before diffusing in the lungs, where it is exhaled in breath.

Authorities now use a nationally accepted scientific formula known as "Henry's law" to convert the amount of alcohol vapor in the lungs to a blood-alcohol level.

The scientific problem is that breath-to-blood ratios vary greatly throughout the population and fluctuate individually, influenced by such factors as body temperature, atmospheric pressure, medical conditions and the precision of the measuring device.

That means the same breath-test result for one person's breath could signal intoxication while for another it could simply mean "just a glass of wine with dinner, officer."

Compounding the matter are California's two distinct driving under the influence laws.

The first law, which has been on the books for decades, requires proof that a driver was intoxicated such as slurred speech, bloodshot eyes and the like. Jurors are told they can presume someone is drunk if blood tests show at least a .08 percent level of alcohol.

The second law, passed by the Legislature in 1981 and updated in 1989, simply defined a drunken driver as someone with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent regardless of appearance or behavior. The state Supreme Court in 1994 extended that definition to include Breathalyzer results, barring drivers charged with the second law from attacking the variability of the breath tests.

Since then, most DUI attorneys viewed disputing Henry's law as a dead end for challenging breath-test machines.

Prosecutors routinely charge their clients with both versions of the law to increase the chances of conviction.

Defense attorneys and prosecutors agreed the state Supreme Court ruling on Thursday reopened the door to breath-test challenges. The court said evidence of the variability of tests can be shown to juries.

"Defense evidence is relevant to rebut the presumption that the defendant was intoxicated, but not to remove the presumption altogether," Justice Carol Corrigan wrote for the Supreme Court.

Courts in Arizona and Vermont have made similar rulings, she said.

Prosecutors said the California ruling will seriously hamper their ability to win convictions in driving under the influence cases.

"It will confuse jurors," said Margaret O'Malley, a Santa Barbara County prosecutor who represented the California District Attorneys Association before the high court.

Defense attorneys said the ruling confirms in court what science already knew: one-size-fits-all breath tests don't necessarily reflect reality for all suspects.

"I've had clients with one lung," said Steven Oberman, a Tennessee lawyer and founder of the National College for DUI Defense, explaining such people will naturally have more alcohol vapors in their breath than someone with two lungs.

To make its ruling, the California Supreme Court used the case of Timmie Lance McNeal, who was convicted in San Bernardino County of drunken driving. He appealed in 2007, arguing that he was improperly barred from challenging the breath test.

The Supreme Court agreed that McNeal was wronged by the trial court but chalked it up to "harmless error." The Supreme Court said there was abundant evidence other than the breath test to support the jury's determination that McNeal was guilty of drunken driving.”

Congratulations to the California Supreme Court for getting this so right!

The case law essentially provides for two remedies if the police destroy potentially exculpatory evidence:

1) Dismissal; or

2) Suppression

The remedy appears to hinge on the intent of the police or other government actor in destroying the evidence.

Georgia destruction of evidence reversal issued on 6-29-09 : DUIAttorney.com: "On June 29, 2009 the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the dismissal of criminal charges after the Gwinnett Police intentionally destroyed evidence that could have helped prove the Defendant's innocence.

The name of the case is Georgia v. Miller, and it has some interesting impications for Georgia DUI cases, and some relevant references to famous nationally known DUI cases."

It is interesting to note that most destroyed evidence never sees daylight in criminal court because either a) the defense never finds out about it; or b) the state plea bargains the case so it never becomes an issue.

I can't emphasize enough the importance of a proactive investigation by the defense in any DUI or criminal case. The earlier it gets started, the more likely the Defense is to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, or to be able to gain the knowledge necessary to take advantage of the situation should the state destroy evidence.

Virginia DUI Physical Control Case - June 30 - 2009 : DUIAttorney.com: "It is the classic story of DUI defendant fights system, comes up with some arguments that could be disguised as potentially fruitful, and then gets shot down by the court of appeals.

The underdog in the story, Ngomondjami, was not conscious. The vehicle was not running."

(Via DUI News.)

This is one of those cases where it seems like the facts should be on the defendant's side, since he wasn't driving, and in fact wasn't even awake. But they weren't because the law is stacked against anybody who is under the influence and has any kind of present ability to drive.

Here, all the defendant would have to have done would have been to wake up.

About a month ago, there was an extremely favorable ruling on the issue which I blogged about in my post "Minnesota DUI breath testing on the ropes." I the basic facts of this newer ruling in my post "Minnesota DUI Breath Test Source Code Case," so won't reiterate them here. For the basics of the issue, see Minnesota DWI breath testing.

Here's a direct quote from the new case, issued (but not published) on 5.26.09. The quote deals with the jurisdictional issue only:

In Underdahl v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety (Underdahl I), the Minnesota Supreme Court considered this same argument on appeal from this court’s denial of a writ of prohibition. 735 N.W.2d 706, 709–10 (Minn. 2007). The supreme court held that because Minn. Stat. § 169A.53 gives the district court subject-matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to the reliability and accuracy of test results, the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. Id. at 711.

Here, appellant is challenging the accuracy of his own Intoxilyzer 5000EN test results, not the general use of Intoxilyzers. Appellant requested the source code in order to prove that his test result was inaccurate. Because Minn. Stat. § 169A.53 allows the district court to hear challenges to the accuracy of appellant’s test results, the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction in this matter.

The case was issued on 5/15/09, out of the fifth district court of appeals of Florida. The petitioner's name is Raymond Good. At the time of writing this, there is no official cite available.

This case began as an Anders appeal. Appellant's underlying crime was grand theft over $20,000, a third-degree felony, to which he pleaded nolo contendere and was sentenced on July 30, 2007, to eighteen months of probation. He was subsequently charged with violation of probation. The public defender was ordered to file a supplemental initial brief addressing whether reversible error was committed when Appellant's probation was revoked due to his arrest for DUI. We cited Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183 (Fla.1978); Lockett v. State, 547 So.2d 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), and Purvis v. State, 397 So.2d 746 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), which stand, overall, for the proposition that probation cannot be revoked based solely on proof of an arrest during the probationary period where the sole condition assertedly violated was that the probationer "live and remain at liberty without violating any law" and the only evidence of a violation was hearsay.

Appellant admitted that he was arrested for DUI and identified the ticket that he received. He did not admit to the DUI. There was no Breathalyzer test, no arrest affidavit, no video of Appellant's behavior during the traffic stop or booking offered in evidence. The arresting officer did not testify. The only evidence of the law violation was the ticket. The trial court found that Appellant violated his probation based on the arrest and reinstated the probation and extended probation to five years. Without this violation, Appellant's probationary period would have ended January 31, 2009.

In its response, the State urges that this appeal should be dismissed because Appellant is now a fugitive from justice, an arrest warrant having been issued for Appellant on December 12, 2008. Under Griffis v. State, 759 So.2d 668 (Fla.2000), if an appellant absconds after filing an appeal, the reviewing court has the discretion to dismiss the appeal. According to the State's filing, Appellant absconded on or about December 12, 2008, and as of the date the State filed its response, February 18, 2009, he was still missing. Had Appellant gone missing after the end of his original term of probation, we would likely not dismiss the appeal; however, having elected to abscond during the original probationary term, this appeal is essentially moot. Accordingly, we elect to dismiss this appeal.

There is a perception that once on felony probation, it is extremely easy to get violated, and an arrest can result in revocation of probation. This would mean that the mere accusation could be enough to send somebody back to prison, even if it is merely an accusation of misdemeanor DUI.

Intoxilyzer, which is a brand of CMI, Inc., is the most widely used type of breath testing device in the country.

The Minnesota Supreme Court issued an opinion on the matter.

In a nutshell, if you can come up with a reason why the source code might help your case, then, in MN DUI cases, you get it. If you can't think of a reason why you need it, then you don't get it.

The problem with this logic is that there may be a legitimate need for the discovery, which a DUI defendant can't discover until they actually have the source code.

Minnesota DUI Lawyer Charles Ramsay, although not a lawyer named in this case, has been instrumental in the fight to obtain the code in Minnesota.

The case is Williams v. State of Georgia, and no official citation is available at this time. The case hinges on Georgia's implied consent law.

ISSUE:

Shawn Williams was charged with vehicular homicide, reckless driving, driving while under the influence of a drug, following too closely, and serious injury by vehicle. He moved to suppress results of a blood test that police obtained from him without first informing him of his implied consent rights. [FN1] The trial court denied his motion, but certified the order for immediate review. We granted Williams' application for interlocutory review. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

RULING:

The amendment at issue here, however, is different. It states that nothing in the implied consent law precludes the state from acquiring a defendant's voluntary consent to chemical testing, or admitting into evidence the results of that testing. The implied consent statute grants drivers the right to refuse to take a state-administered test, with one of the consequences of exercising that right being that evidence of such refusal is admissible at trial. Unlike the amendment at issue in the cases relied upon by the state, the amendment here eliminates the need to give the notice where an individual "voluntarily" agrees to testing. This amendment not only changes the substance of the implied consent warning, it does away with the requirement that the warning be given at all where an officer manages to otherwise lawfully obtain consent to testing. This is not merely a procedural or evidentiary change, but one eliminating a defendant's substantive right to refuse to submit to testing. Therefore, the trial court erred in applying the amendment retroactively and in denying Williams' motion to suppress.

For more about Georgia DUI Law, see also, Georgia DUI Penalties and Georgia DUI Process.

Wisconsin supreme court takes on drunk driving evidence - WKOW 27: Madison, WI Breaking News, Weather and Sports -: "'If you're going to drive drunk, make sure you really go big, because you need to have an accident, if it's really bad and there's a gasoline smell and someone's almost died, that you're not going to be able to arrest unless they can smell alcohol or see beer cans, or something like that in the car,'   Ziegler said.

'That's the standard you're asking this court to accept.'

Cohen demurred.   'I'm not saying you need an odor of alcohol, I'm not saying you need a beer can, I'm just saying you need something that would indicate the use of intoxicants.

Justices pointed out state law assumes permission to test blood for alcohol, even if a driver is unconscious, if there's an odor of booze, or probable cause.

'The inference to me is that you can have probable cause to believe a violation, without detecting any presence of alcohol,'   Justice Ann Walsh-Bradley said.

Another standard that determines whether a drunk driving investigation can happen is the totality of the circumstances.

Mitchell Lange's arrest and blood draw took place at a Madison hospital.   It was his second drunk driving arrest."

This case could mark a shift in Wisconsin DUI law, and has the potential to reach the US Supreme Court.

The full opinion is here.

Because the circuit court did not make a factual finding that Riley was sleepwalking at the time of the charged offenses, and because Riley's unconsciousness defense was predicated solely on the assumption that he was in fact sleepwalking, Riley failed to meet his burden to establish his unconsciousness defense. Without that defense, the evidence established merely voluntary intoxication and was otherwise sufficient to sustain his conviction for maiming. We will thus affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia upholding Riley's convictions.

Scratch off one more novel attempted DUI defense as ineffective, at least in Virginia.

Learn more about Virginia DUI Law.

If you are accused of a crime in Missouri, and can't afford to hire a private criminal defense lawyer, you are entitled to a public defender. The catch is that the Missouri public defense system is the second least funded per capita system in the country. While public defenders in most states are overworked, the MO system is an extreme. Here's are quotes from a good article that discusses the ruling:

Appeals court says Missouri public defenders cannot refuse new cases - Kansas City Star: "A Missouri appeals court ruled Tuesday that the state’s public defender system cannot decline to accept new cases because of its caseload crisis.

The opinion, from a three-judge panel in Kansas City, throws out a state regulation that allowed public defender offices to refuse cases until caseloads had declined to a more manageable level.

. . .

Missouri ranks 49th among U.S. states in per-capita spending on indigent defense. Offices in Kansas City and Liberty, which serve Jackson, Clay and Platte counties, have not stopped taking cases."

Here is the entire opinion from the Missouri Court of Appeals.

We'll see what happens at the Missouri Supreme Court level, but at the moment, if I were a public defender in Missouri I would think long and hard about going private. If I were accused of a crime in Missouri, I would not want a public defender, not because they are bad, but an overextended criminal defense attorney is just like a surgeon running on a week of no sleep... might be the best lawyer in the world, but presently lacks the capacity to do everything possible in every situation.

Mr. Edwards appealed the court's denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal from his MO DWI arrest.

Defendant’s trial took place on April 25, 2008. The State presented testimony from Ayers. The Defendant chose not to present evidence. Defendant filed motions for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s evidence and the close of all evidence, both of which the trial court denied. After the jury instructions were read, and during deliberations, the trial court received a note from the jurors asking, “What is a DUI. What is a DWI. Are they both the same. Is it illega[l] to have a drink and th[e]n drive.” After discussing the questions with the parties, the trial court responded, “You must be guided by your recollection of the evidence and the instructions you have been given. No further instruction may be given.” The jury then returned a verdict of guilty of driving while intoxicated. On May 5, 2008, Defendant filed both a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial. (emphasis added)

Look at the bolded quote above. This is the most common question that I hear asked by jurors in DUI cases. (As an aside, there are many acronyms for impaired driving, and the initials used typically indicate near identical charges from state to state, but some states chose one acronym, while others don't. Missouri happens to use "DWI" most commonly.) Now look at the answer the judge gave, also in bold. This is a variation of the most typical answer to jury questions in DUI cases.

The question is, is it a fair answer. Under Missouri DWI law it is not illegal per se to have alcohol and get behind the wheel of a vehicle.

Let's see what the Missouri Court of Appeals has to say about it.

Here, Defendant fails to adequately brief his third point on appeal. His argument section simply recites the relevant facts, makes a one-sentence conclusory statement, and then briefly argues policy. Glaringly absent from Defendant's argument is any supporting legal authority. We find that Defendant has abandoned this argument, and we decline to review this point on appeal.

Oops, a DUI defendant can't prove a negative. Sorry, appeal denied. Next.

Ariz. court overturns order on breath-testing code - Forbes.com: "An Arizona appellate court skirted a big-picture issue snagging numerous drunken-driving cases as it issued a narrow ruling that overturned a judge's order requiring prosecutors to obtain a breath-testing machine's computer code and provide it to defense attorneys.

A Tucson-based panel of Court of Appeals judges ruled that Judge Deborah Bernini of Pima County Superior Court shouldn't have issued the order because law enforcement officials did not have the 'source code' for the Intoxilyzer 8000 machine and had no way to get it from the out-of-state manufacturer.

The next step in the case will likely be for defense lawyers to ask Bernini to prohibit use of breath-test results from the Intoxilyzer 8000, defense attorney Joseph P. St. Louis said from Tucson.

Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals' ruling Tuesday leaves a tangle of rulings by Superior Court and municipal judges, some of which prohibit use of the evidence while others that permit it, said Deputy Pima County Attorney Jacob Lines.

'It really depends on which judge you're in front of,' Line said. 'It's sort of been a mess.'

In cases where judges don't allow breath-test results to be used, prosecutors still press many drunken-driving cases by using evidence that includes testimony from police about drivers' performance behind the wheel and in field-sobriety tests, St. Louis said.

The Pima County Attorney's Office drew support in the Court of Appeals case from the Arizona Attorney General's Office and prosecution agencies for jurisdictions that included Phoenix, Tempe, Tucson and Yavapai County.

The Arizona Department of Public Safety has 250 of the Intoxilyzer 8000 machines in use statewide, spokesman Bart Graves said. Municipal police using the machines include departments in Phoenix and Tucson, officials said."

This issue has not gained the kind of traction in the Phoenix area that it has in Tucson.

The District Court’s decision to deny a motion to dismiss in a criminal case presents a question of law that we review de novo. We conduct plenary review to determine whether a district court’s conclusion is correct. State v. Howard, 2008 MT 173, ¶ 8, 343 Mont. 378, 184 P.3d 344. We review a district court’s denial of a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress evidence to determine whether the district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the district court’s interpretation and application of the law is correct.

The full opinion is here.

Read the full opinion here.

Essentially, if the State court denies you the right to strike a juror, SCOTUS doesn't care.

Read the opinion here.

Here's why the court found that the police had probable cause to arrest for DUI prior to the defendant entering her house:

In this case, Deputy McFarland clearly had probable cause to arrest Finnicum for DUI before she retreated into the house. Finnicum’s son had informed him that Finnicum had been drinking all day, was highly intoxicated, and had recently driven away. About half an hour later, Deputy McFarland saw Finnicum driving on the adjacent public road and flagged her down. He then made observations that tended to confirm the report that she was intoxicated--she smelled strongly of alcohol, slurred her speech, had glassy and bloodshot eyes, and seemed confused. When Deputy Vrevich arrived, he noticed that Finnicum seemed unable to walk in a straight line. Collectively, this information amply provided probable cause for Finnicum’s arrest for DUI, and McFarland was authorized by state law to make a misdemeanor arrest without a warrant because the offense was committed in his presence. See I.C. § 19-603(1). Deputy McFarland not only possessed probable cause before he entered the residence, but he had already taken steps toward an arrest, notifying Finnicum that he suspected her of DUI and ordering her to stay by her vehicle while he finished interviewing her son. Although Finnicum initially complied, she ultimately disregarded this order and went into her residence.

The result of this case is predictable. Thinking about it logically, if the entry by police into the house under these circumstances was deemed unconstitutional, then anybody being pursued by police for an Idaho DUI would be on notice that if they could make it inside their residence before the police caught up to them, they would be safe from arrest (and then, of course, could quickly consume alcohol at home to further blur the issue).

I hate to say it, but I think the Court got this one right.

Read the whole opinion.

Quick fact summary by the Minnesota Court of Appeals:

The district court granted respondent’s request for discovery of the source code, finding it “relevant and necessary for [respondent’s] defense.” The district court specifically ordered the state to “provide the full source code to [respondent] within 30 days of the filing of this order,” and stated that “[i]f the source code is not produced within 30 days of the filing of this order, the Intoxilyzer test result shall be suppressed.”

Here is the (pardon my judicial criticism) but stupid logic that is used by the court, and is used in many cases to justify admission of unreliable evidence in DWI prosecutions:

The state argues that the district court’s discovery order has a critical impact on its case because if the Intoxilyzer results are suppressed, the state will be unable to prosecute respondent for second-degree DWI over .08 alcohol concentration. We agree. While the state may still prosecute respondent on the DWI charge based on the officers’ observations, this court has held that a critical impact is shown when evidence essential to prove some, but not all, criminal counts is suppressed. See State v. Grohoski, 390 N.W.2d 348, 352 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that the critical-impact test is met when, without the chemical-test evidence, four of six charges would be dismissed), review denied (Minn. Aug. 27, 1986). Suppression of the Intoxilyzer result in this case, as required by the district court’s discovery order, has a critical impact on the state’s ability to prosecute respondent.

So essentially, their legal reasoning is that they can't compel the source code because they know that the company that makes the Intoxilyzer, CMI, will not give the code up. Therefore, even though the breath test evidence might be unreliable, they are going to allow the state and CMI to get away with it because to do otherwise hurts the state's case!

If you care about justice and this doesn't make you angry, check your pulse. Did these judges actually go to law school?

It gets better:

The state argues that respondent has not demonstrated that the source code has any specific relevance to his guilt or innocence. Specifically, the state contends respondent has not presented evidence raising a question as to the accuracy of the test in his case and has not shown that the Intoxilyzer malfunctioned or that the result was unreliable as to him. The state further argues that “[r]espondent failed to explain to the District Court how the source code could demonstrate some flaw in the software of the instrument or its operation.” (emphasis added)

So this court wants the defense to produce evidence that there is something wrong with the code from the machine in order to compel disclosure of the code. How could they possibly show there was something wrong with it without having a chance to examine it?

With the judicial clarity that this ruling shows on the part of these judges, perhaps they would rule that a psychic's assessment that the test was incorrect would suffice? What the heck are they looking for?

Here's the take home message. If you are accused of DUI in Minnesota, your battle is uphill, with the wind blowing in your face and little monkeys in black robes trying to steal your clothes and pickpocket you as you try to move forward.

Learn more about Minnesota DWI law, and find a Minnesota DWI lawyer.

Officer Brown could not reasonably conclude that Stahr was driving under the influence simply because he showed signs of intoxication when he exited the state trooper’s vehicle without further establishing the timeframe between the accident and the observed intoxication. No timeframe between the accident and arrest was established according to the evidence provided to the trial court. We cannot, therefore, conclude that Officer Brown had reasonable suspicion that Stahr was in control of his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Since there was no objective evidence to support Officer Brown’s suspicion that Stahr was driving under the influence, the order of the trial court is reversed, and Stahr’s operating privileges are reinstated. (Quoted from original opinion).

This is a good result and one that makes me hopeful that there is justice in the world this Wednesday morning.

It is not illegal to get drunk after an accident. The State, even in DUI cases, is supposed to have the burden of proof. Learn more about Pennsylvania DUI law and how PA DUI suspensions work.

95088 -- State v. King -- Davis -- Kansas Supreme Court: "The alleged Doyle violation in this case occurred during the prosecutor's cross-examination of King--an exchange that falls squarely within the period when the prosecution and defense offer evidence at trial. See K.S.A. 22-3414 (order of trial). Contrary to King's characterization of his claim on appeal, he has presented an evidentiary question that may only be reviewed upon compliance with the contemporaneous-objection rule. K.S.A. 60-404.

There was no objection to the prosecutor's allegedly improper questions at trial. We conclude that the Court of Appeals therefore correctly determined the issue was not preserved for appellate review."

The Court rejected both of defendant's arguments, sustaining the conviction and sentence for sodomy.

The opinion can be read here.

Here is an excerpt from an article describing the case:

Conn. court restores non-driving DUI conviction - Projo 7 to 7 News Blog | Rhode Island news | The Providence Journal: "HARTFORD, Conn. (AP) -- Drunken people don't actually have to drive their cars to be charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled Monday.

The court's 5-to-0 ruling came in the case of Michael Cyr, who was arrested in Manchester in February 2005 in a parking lot near a bar. He had started his car remotely and then sat in the driver's seat intoxicated, but never put the key in the ignition and didn't drive anywhere.

Justices ordered the state Appellate Court, which had thrown out Cyr's conviction, to reinstate it and send the case back to Manchester Superior Court for sentencing.

Cyr, 50, of Andover, faces a year in prison followed by three years of probation. He pleaded no contest after a judge rejected his motions to dismiss the case. It's his third drunken driving conviction, following others in 1997 and 1998.

'In starting the engine of his vehicle remotely then getting behind the steering wheel, the defendant clearly undertook the first act in a sequence of steps necessary to set in motion the motive power of a vehicle,' Chief Justice Chase Rogers wrote in the opinion.

The 'motive power' phrase comes from a 1939 Connecticut court decision, cited by the Supreme Court on Monday, that defines what constitutes 'operating' a motor vehicle."

Clearly it is not a good idea to use your vehicle as a shelter to "sleep it off" if you need to use the vehicle's heater or air conditioning.

The Associated Press: Double jeopardy in before US Supreme Court: "HOUSTON (AP) — A former Enron Corp. executive is hoping a little known component of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause will help him avoid a retrial on charges related to financial fraud at the once mighty energy giant. Attorneys for F. Scott Yeager are set to present oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court on Monday on the issue of whether double jeopardy prevents prosecutors from retrying individuals after a jury votes not guilty on some charges, but fails to reach a verdict on others that share an element with the acquitted charges. Prosecutors contend retrying Yeager on counts the jury couldn't decide doesn't raise double jeopardy issues. Yeager was one of five former executives from Enron's failed broadband venture who were tried in 2005. They were accused of lying to shareholders and the market about the broadband division's value and hoping to get rich by selling the inflated shares."