Montana DUI Opinion issued February 24, 2009
In an opinion issued, but not released for publication, of February 24, 2009, the Supreme Court of Montana issued a new Montana DUI opinion.
The Case:
The Briefs:
Appeallant's Opening Brief - Appellee's Brief - Reply Brief
The basis for appeal:
Ditton now appeals from the District Court's decision, raising several issues. First, he maintains that there was no particularized suspicion justifying the stop. Second, he argues that Sergeant Crawford lacked the authority to stop and arrest him for DUI. Third, Ditton argues that the District Court erred in concluding that his motion to dismiss was properly denied and maintains that the Municipal Court was required to make a judicial determination, supported by a sworn oath or affidavit, that probable cause existed for the DUI charge filed against him in the Notice. Finally, Ditton argues that the Municipal Court erred in requiring him to pay his fines from his Veterans Affairs disability payment, arguing that the Municipal Court was federally preempted from basing his fines on this income.
Issue 1: Did the District Court err in concluding there was particularized suspicion to justify Ditton's stop?
Particularized suspicion to justify an investigative stop is proven by the presentation of "objective data from which an experienced officer can make certain inferences, and a resulting suspicion that a person is or has been engaged in wrongdoing." Morris v. State, 2001 MT 13, ¶ 9, 304 Mont. 114, 18 P.3d 1003. Whether particularized suspicion exists is based on the totality of the circumstances. Morris, ¶ 9. Here, the odd angle of Ditton's car, the fact that he was leaving a bar late at night, his ensuing driving behavior, and his failure to properly make a right hand turn, provided objective data from which an experienced officer like Sergeant Crawford could suspect that Ditton was driving under the influence. Whether or not Ditton's driving behavior was technically "legal," the totality of the circumstances before Sergeant Crawford provided a sufficient basis for particularized suspicion to justify the traffic stop in this case. See State v. Brander, 2004 MT 150, ¶ 6, 321 Mont. 484, 92 P.3d 1173; Widdicombe v. State ex. rel. Lafond, 2004 MT 49, ¶ 12, 320 Mont. 133, 85 P.3d 1271. Because Ditton has failed to show that either the Municipal Court or District Court erred in this regard and that any of the findings of fact in this case were clearly erroneous, we affirm the District Court's decision.
Issue 2: Did the District Court err in concluding there was probable cause for Ditton's DUI arrest?
We agree with the District Court that these facts provided sufficient probable cause for Sergeant Crawford to arrest Ditton for DUI. Once again, Ditton has failed to show that any of findings of fact in support of probable cause were clearly erroneous, or that either of the lower courts erred in any respect. Thus, we affirm the conclusion that Sergeant Crawford had probable cause to arrest Ditton for DUI.
Issue 3: Did the District Court err in concluding that Ditton was properly charged with DUI in the Municipal Court?
However, probable cause to arrest Ditton for DUI was clearly present in this case. Thus, Sergeant Crawford had the option of either formally arresting Ditton and placing him in detention, or issuing the Notice. He chose the latter course. Because probable cause to arrest Ditton was present, and because the Notice does not require a sworn affidavit or oath to be valid, we conclude the District Court did not err in affirming the Municipal Court's decision to deny Ditton's motion to dismiss.
And now for what Ditton got from his efforts:
We affirm Ditton's conviction for DUI in Municipal Court. However, we remand Ditton's sentence to the District Court with instructions that it vacate the imposition of $885 in fees and costs based on his Veterans Affairs disability benefits.
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