Officers can be sued in DUI death case
This one is long but worth the read because it explains the treatment of DUI arrestees by many officers. Many people arrested for drunk driving complain that the officers treat them poorly and some are overtly rude.
Ohio has just ruled, in a November 21, 2008 decision, that government personnel can be civilly sued when they release a vehicle of a known DWI driver and then that driver injures or kills another. This case is important, and my opinion is that it will go all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States. If officer liability in this type of situation sticks, plaintiffs’ attorneys will look to police officers and other law enforcement workers when a drunk driver causes grief. Just like in dram shop cases, a technically not-guilty party will be pulled into the civil litigation boat.
While I’m not concerned with the civil aspects of this ruling, it’s impact on officer behavior could be alarming. Do we want officers to start acting to prevent lawsuits rather than doing their jobs of professionally removing impaired drivers from the roads?
The Cite: Estate of Jillian Graves v The City of Circleville, Court of Appeals of Ohio, Decided Nov. 21, 2008.
The Ruling – why police officers and dispatchers can be sued for the premature release of a DUI driver’s vehicle from impound when the DUI driver then kills a third party.
In this case, the Officers failed to ensure that Copley's vehicle remained impounded until released by court order. In doing so, they gave a habitual drunk driver, known to drive on a suspended license, access to his vehicle without a judicial determination that it was safe to do so. The Officers argue that Copley's conduct was the superseding/intervening cause of Ms. Graves's death. However, we do not believe that Ms. Graves's death at Copley's hand was so remote that tort jurisprudence will excuse the officers' conduct as a matter of law. Under the circumstances, it was reasonably foreseeable that Copley would drive his vehicle drunk, cause an accident, and injure or kill another driver. A reasonable trier of fact could find that Ms. Graves's death was the natural and probable consequence of the Officers' premature release of Copley's vehicle. Thus, denial of the Officers' joint motion for summary judgment was appropriate. Therefore, we overrule the Officers' sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
An analysis of Officer Shaw’s conduct:
The Estate contends that Officer Shaw acted in a wanton or reckless manner when he failed to ensure that Copley's vehicle would not be released without a court order and failed to take any steps to retrieve the vehicle after its premature release. Officer Shaw admitted in his deposition that when he arrested Copley for DUI and DUS, he knew that Copley's license had been suspended due to a prior DUI violation. Officer Shaw knew that under those circumstances Copley's vehicle could not be released without a court order. Yet Officer Shaw did nothing to ensure Copley's vehicle would not be released without a court order. Even after reviewing Copley's lengthy DUI history on the LEADS report, Officer Shaw did nothing to prevent Copley from retrieving the vehicle. Upon learning Copley in fact retrieved the vehicle, Officer Shaw did nothing to secure its return.
Construing all the evidence presented in favor of the Estate, it is apparent that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions regarding whether Officer Shaw acted in a wanton or reckless manner. Based on Officer Shaw's knowledge of Copley's suspended license, extensive DUI record, and most recent arrest for DUI, we find that reasonable minds could conclude that Officer Shaw was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize not only that allowing Copley to access his vehicle without court permission created an unreasonable risk of physical harm to others on the roadway, but also that such risk was substantially greater than that which was necessary to make his conduct negligent. Reasonable minds could likewise conclude that given Copley's propensity to drive under the influence, Officer Shaw must have been conscious that his failure to follow the impound procedure would in all probability result in injury.
Officer Eversole’s conduct:
While it is unclear from Officer Eversole's deposition testimony whether he knew that Copley's vehicle had not been properly impounded, a reasonable jury could conclude that he did based on Ms. Brewer's testimony. Construing all the evidence presented in favor of the Estate, it is apparent that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions regarding whether Officer Eversole acted in a wanton or reckless manner. Based on Officer Shaw's knowledge of the charges, knowledge that the vehicle had not been properly impounded, and concern that Copley would kill someone with the vehicle, we find that reasonable minds could conclude that Officer Eversole was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize not only that allowing Copley to have access to his vehicle without court permission created an unreasonable risk of physical harm to others on the roadway, but also that such risk was substantially greater than that which was necessary to make his conduct negligent. Reasonable minds could likewise conclude that in light of Officer Eversole's verbalized concern that Copley would kill someone with the car, Officer Eversole must have been conscious that his failure to follow the impound procedure would in all probability result in injury.
Could the dispatcher’s conduct amount to more than negligence?
Construing all the evidence presented in favor of the Estate, it is apparent that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions regarding whether Dispatcher Carpenter acted in a wanton or reckless manner. The Estate presented evidence that Dispatcher Carpenter knew of the charges, knew of Copley's criminal record, and should have known the department's procedures for impounding vehicles. Based on this evidence, we find that reasonable minds could conclude that Dispatcher Carpenter was aware of or should have been aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize not only that allowing Copley to have access to his vehicle without court permission created an unreasonable risk of physical harm to others on the roadway, but also that such risk was substantially greater than that which was necessary to make his conduct negligent. Reasonable minds could likewise conclude that in light of this evidence, Dispatcher Carpenter must have been conscious that ignoring proper impound procedure would in all probability result in injury.
My Comments: This is another symptom of the “war on drunk driving,” and I’m sure that MADD will rejoice in this ruling. I wonder, however, if it serves the public interest. On the one hand, a habitual drunk driver is unlikely to have insurance or resources for a victim’s family to go after. On the other hand, this case could taint all future actions of the officers involved, and make it more likely that they will err on the side of not giving a citizen the benefit of the doubt.
No easy solutions here. Interested to hear your point of view.
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